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OPINION OF THE COURT 
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Krause, Circuit Judge. 
The advent of social media has presented the courts 
with new challenges in the prosecution of criminal offenses, 
including in the way data is authenticated under the Federal 
Rules of Evidence—a prerequisite to admissibility at trial. 
 Appellant Tony Jefferson Browne was convicted of child 
pornography and sexual offenses with minors based in part on 
records of “chats” exchanged over Facebook and now 
contests his conviction on the ground that these records were 
not properly authenticated with evidence of his authorship. 
 Although we disagree with the Government’s assertion that, 
3 
 
pursuant to Rule 902(11), the contents of these 
communications were “self-authenticating” as business 
records accompanied by a certificate from the website’s 
records custodian, we will nonetheless affirm because the trial 
record reflects more than sufficient extrinsic evidence to link 
Browne to the chats and thereby satisfy the Government’s 
authentication burden under a conventional Rule 901 
analysis. 
I. Background 
A. Facts 
Facebook is a social networking website that requires 
users to provide a name and email address to establish an 
account.  Account holders can, among other things, add other 
users to their “friends” list and communicate with them 
through Facebook chats, or messages. 
Under the Facebook account name “Billy Button,” 
Browne began exchanging messages with 18-year-old Nicole 
Dalmida in November 2011.  They met in person a few 
months later and then exchanged sexually explicit 
photographs of themselves through Facebook chats.  Browne 
then threatened to publish Dalmida’s photos online unless 
Dalmida engaged in oral sex and promised to delete the 
photos only if she provided him the password to her 
Facebook account. 
Using Dalmida’s account, Browne made contact with 
four of Dalmida’s “Facebook friends,” all minors—T.P. (12 
years old), A.M. (15 years old), J.B. (15 years old) and J.S. 
(17 years old)—and solicited explicit photos from them by a 
variety of means.  Once he had the minors’ photos, he 
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repeated the pattern he had established with Dalmida, 
threatening all of them with the public exposure of their 
images unless they agreed to engage in various sexual acts 
and sent additional explicit photos of themselves to his Button 
Facebook account or to his phone number (“the 998 
number”).  He arranged to meet with three of the minors and 
sexually assaulted one. 
 On receiving information from the Virgin Islands 
Police Department, agents from the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) interviewed Dalmida and three of the minors.  
In June 2013, DHS arrested Browne and executed a search 
warrant on his residence.  Among the items seized was a cell 
phone that matched the 998 number and from which text 
messages and photos of the minors were recovered.  During 
questioning and at trial, Browne admitted the 998 number and 
phone belonged to him.  DHS executed a search warrant on 
the Button Facebook account, which Browne also admitted 
belonged to him, and Facebook provided five sets of chats 
and a certificate of authenticity executed by its records 
custodian.   
B. Proceedings 
 At trial, over defense counsel’s objections, the District 
Court admitted the five Facebook chat logs and certificate of 
authenticity into evidence.  Four of the chats involved 
communications between the Billy Button account and, 
respectively, Dalmida, J.B., J.S. and T.P. 1  The fifth chat did 
                                                 
 1 The Government did not seek to admit into evidence 
any Facebook messages sent from the Button account to the 
remaining minor victim, A.M., but photos of A.M. were 
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not involve Button’s account and took place between 
Dalmida and J.B., on the subject of Browne’s sexual assault 
of J.B.  The certificate stated, in accordance with Rule 
902(11) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, that the records 
that Facebook had produced for the named accounts met the 
business records requirements of Rule 803(6)(A)–(C).  
Tracking the language of Rule 803(6), the custodian certified 
that the records “were made and kept by the automated 
systems of Facebook in the course of regularly conducted 
activity as a regular practice of Facebook . . . [and] were 
made at or near the time the information was transmitted by 
the Facebook user.”  App. 403; see Fed. R. Evid. 803(6). 
 Relevant to this appeal, seven witnesses testified for 
the Government: Dalmida and the four minors, and two 
Special Agents from DHS.  Dalmida and the four minors 
provided extensive testimony about their communications 
with Button.  According to that testimony, using Dalmida’s 
Facebook account, Browne sent explicit photos of Dalmida to 
T.P. and A.M. and requested photos in return, and using his 
own Facebook account, he contacted J.S. and offered to pay 
her for sexually explicit photos of herself.  The testimony and 
chat logs also established that Browne used Dalmida’s 
account to instruct J.B. to add him as a friend on Facebook, 
after which he used his own account to send her explicit 
photos of himself and asked her to do the same. 
 All four minors testified that after receiving requests 
for explicit photos, they complied by sending Facebook 
messages to the Button account or by texting images to the 
                                                                                                             
among those recovered from the phone seized from Browne’s 
home and admitted into evidence. 
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998 number, and that they subsequently received threats that 
their photos would be published online if they did not comply 
with the sender’s sexual demands.  And on the stand, 
Dalmida and each of the four minors identified various 
Government exhibits as photos they took of themselves and 
sent to the Button account or the 998 number.   
 Dalmida and three of the minors (all but T.P.) also 
testified to meeting Browne in person and identified Browne 
in open court as the man they had met after making meeting 
arrangements through messages to the Button account or the 
998 number.  Two of the minors who met Browne in person 
testified that they were forced to do more than send additional 
explicit photographs.  A.M. explained that after receiving 
instructions to text her photos to the 998 number, she received 
messages from the Button account demanding sexual 
intercourse and threatening her with the exposure of her 
images if she refused.  After sending her the images, 
presumably to prove they were in his possession, the 
individual using the 998 number repeated his threat and 
instructed her to “play with [her]self” on a video chat site so 
he could watch.  Fearful he would follow through on his 
threat, she complied.  Another minor, J.B., testified that after 
she arranged to meet Browne through the Button account, 
Browne sexually assaulted her and recorded the encounter.  
She also confirmed that she exchanged Facebook messages 
with Dalmida describing the incident shortly after it occurred. 
 Special Agents Blyden and Carter testified to details of 
Browne’s arrest and the forensics examination of the items 
seized from Browne’s residence.  Special Agent Blyden 
recounted Browne’s post-arrest statements that he knew and 
had exchanged “nude photos” with Dalmida, that he admitted 
to knowing three of the minors (all but A.M.), and that he had 
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paid minor J.S. for nude photos of herself.  Special Agent 
Blyden also identified the Facebook chat conversations as 
records she had received from Facebook and testified that 
Facebook had provided the accompanying certificate.  Special 
Agent Carter, the forensics agent, testified to the items 
recovered from Browne’s home, including the phone 
associated with the 998 number, and identified sexually 
explicit photos of Dalmida and three of the minors (all but 
J.B.) as images that were recovered from the phone.2 
The defense put only Browne on the stand.  Browne 
testified that his Facebook name was Billy Button, and that he 
knew Dalmida and minors J.S. and J.B. and had corresponded 
with them on Facebook.  He denied knowing or 
communicating with minor T.P., contradicting Special Agent 
Blyden’s testimony that he had admitted to this after his 
arrest, and did not state whether he knew A.M.  Browne also 
denied sending any photos to the victims or requesting photos 
from them.  As to the incriminating data discovered on the 
phone with the 998 number, he testified that he loaned the 
phone to Dalmida in December of 2012 and intermittently 
between January and March 2013, and that he also loaned the 
phone to a cousin at an unspecified time.3  At one point 
                                                 
 2 At trial, however, J.B. identified several Government 
exhibits as photos she had sent to Button’s Facebook account 
or the 998 number. 
 3 Dalmida testified that she never had Browne’s phone 
in her possession, and Special Agent Blyden testified that 
during the investigation Dalmida denied ever receiving a 
phone from Browne. 
8 
 
during his testimony, he confirmed he owned a second phone 
and number (“the 344 number”).   
Browne was convicted by a jury after a two-day trial.4  
He now appeals his conviction on the ground that the 
Facebook records were not properly authenticated and should 
not have been admitted into evidence.   
II. Jurisdiction 
                                                 
4 The jury convicted Browne on twelve counts, 
including the production of child pornography in violation of 
18 U.S.C. § 2251(a) (Counts 1–4); the coercion and 
enticement of a minor to engage in sexual activity in violation 
of 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b) (Count 8); the receipt of child 
pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2) (Counts 
9–12); and the transfer of obscene material to minors under 
age 16, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1470 (Count 17, 19–20).  
The jury acquitted Browne on three counts for coercion and 
enticement, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b) (Counts 5–7), 
and on the count of aggravated first degree rape in violation 
of 14 V.I.C. § 1700(c) (Count 22).  Before the jury rendered 
its verdict, the defense successfully moved to dismiss a 
charge of extortion using interstate commerce, in violation of 
18 U.S.C. 875(d) (Count 21), and the Government 
successfully moved to dismiss one of the counts for the 
transfer of obscene material to minors under age 16 (Count 
18) and all charges for possession of child pornography under 
18 U.S.C. 2252(a)(4)(B) (Counts 13–16) in light of the fact 
that possessing child pornography is a lesser-included offense 
of the receipt of child pornography, United States v. Miller, 
527 F.3d 54, 71–72 (3d Cir. 2008). 
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The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3231 and 48 U.S.C. § 1612(c), and we have jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review the District Court’s 
decision regarding the authentication of evidence for abuse of 
discretion,  United States v. Turner, 718 F.3d 226, 232 (3d 
Cir. 2013), and exercise plenary review over its interpretation 
of the Federal Rules of Evidence, United States v. Console, 
13 F.3d 641, 656 (3d Cir. 1993). 
III. Discussion 
Browne argues that the Facebook records were not 
properly authenticated because the Government failed to 
establish that he was the person who authored the 
communications.  More specifically, Browne contends that no 
witness identified the Facebook chat logs on the stand; 
nothing in the contents of the messages was uniquely known 
to Browne; and Browne was not the only individual with 
access to the Button account or the 998 number.  The 
Government, for its part, argues the Facebook records are 
business records that were properly authenticated pursuant to 
Rule 902(11) of the Federal Rules of Evidence by way of a 
certificate from Facebook’s records custodian. 
The proper authentication of social media records is an 
issue of first impression in this Court.  In view of Browne’s 
challenge to the authentication and admissibility of the chat 
logs, our analysis proceeds in three steps.  First, as with non-
digital records, we assess whether the communications at 
issue are, in their entirety, business records that may be “self-
authenticated” by way of a certificate from a records 
custodian under Rule 902(11) of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence.  Second, because we conclude that they are not, we 
consider whether the Government nonetheless provided 
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sufficient extrinsic evidence to authenticate the records under 
a traditional Rule 901 analysis.  And, finally, we address 
whether the chat logs, although properly authenticated, should 
have been excluded as inadmissible hearsay, as well as 
whether their admission was harmless. 
A.  Self-authentication 
 To satisfy the requirement under Rule 901(a) of the 
Federal Rules of Evidence that all evidence be authenticated 
or identified prior to admission, the proponent of the evidence 
must offer “evidence sufficient to support a finding that the 
item is what the proponent claims it is.”  Rule 901(b), in turn, 
sets forth a non-exhaustive list of appropriate methods of 
authentication, including not only “[t]estimony that an item is 
what it is claimed to be,” Fed. R. Evid. 901(b)(1), but also 
“appearance, contents, substance, internal patterns, or other 
distinctive characteristics of the item, taken together with all 
the circumstances,” Fed. R. Evid. 901(b)(4), and “[e]vidence 
describing a process or system and showing that it produces 
an accurate result,” Fed. R. Evid. 901(b)(9). 
 The central dispute in this case is complicated, 
however, by the Government’s contention that it 
authenticated the Facebook chat logs by way of Rule 902, 
under which extrinsic evidence is not required for certain 
documents that bear sufficient indicia of reliability as to be 
“self-authenticating.”  Specifically, the Government relies on 
Rule 902(11), which provides that “records of a regularly 
conducted activity” that fall into the hearsay exception under 
Rule 803(6)—more commonly known as the “business 
records exception”—may be authenticated by way of a 
certificate from the records custodian, as long as the 
proponent of the evidence gives the adverse party reasonable 
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notice and makes the record and certificate available for 
inspection in advance of trial.  Fed. R. Evid. 902(11).5 
 The viability of the Government’s position turns on 
whether Facebook chat logs are the kinds of documents that 
are properly understood as records of a regularly conducted 
activity under Rule 803(6), such that they qualify for self-
authentication under Rule 902(11).  We conclude that they 
                                                 
 5 Rule 803(6) allows for the admission of “[a] record 
of an act, event, condition, opinion, or diagnosis” containing 
hearsay if: “(A) the record was made at or near the time by—
or from information transmitted by—someone with 
knowledge; (B) the record was kept in the course of a 
regularly conducted activity of a business, organization, 
occupation, or calling, whether or not for profit; (C) making 
the record was a regular practice of that activity; (D) all these 
conditions are shown by the testimony of the custodian or 
another qualified witness, or by a certification that complies 
with Rule 902(11) or (12) or with a statute permitting 
certification; and (E) the opponent does not show that the 
source of information or the method or circumstances of 
preparation indicate a lack of trustworthiness.”  Fed. R. Evid. 
803(6).  Rule 902(11), in turn, was adopted by amendment in 
2000 to allow records of regularly conducted activity to be 
authenticated by certificate rather than by live testimony and 
provides that the proponent of a business record who meets 
certain notice requirements need not provide extrinsic 
evidence of authentication if the record meets the 
requirements of Rule 803(6)(A) through (C) “as shown by a 
certification of the custodian or another qualified person,” 
Fed. R. Evid. 902(11); see Fed. R. Evid. 902 advisory 
committee’s note (2000). 
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are not, and that any argument to the contrary misconceives 
the relationship between authentication and relevance, as well 
as the purpose of the business records exception to the 
hearsay rule. 
 First, to be admissible, evidence must be relevant, 
which means “its existence simply has some ‘tendency to 
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the 
determination of the action more probable or less probable 
than it would be without the evidence.’”  United States v. 
Jones, 566 F.3d 353, 364 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Fed. R. 
Evid. 401).  Because evidence can have this tendency only if 
it is what the proponent claims it is, i.e., if it is authentic, 
United States v. Rawlins, 606 F.3d 73, 82 (3d Cir. 2010), 
“Rule 901(a) treats preliminary questions of authentication 
and identification as matters of conditional relevance 
according to the standards of Rule 104(b),”  United States v. 
Reilly, 33 F.3d 1396, 1404 (3d Cir. 1994) (quoting Jack B. 
Weinstein & Margaret A. Berger, 5 Weinstein’s Evidence 
¶ 901(a)[01] at 901–15 (1993)).6  Rule 104(b), in turn, 
provides that “[w]hen the relevance of evidence depends on 
whether a fact exists, proof must be introduced sufficient to 
support a finding that the fact does exist.”  Fed. R. Evid. 
                                                 
 6 Put differently, “[a]uthenticity is elemental to 
relevance.” Rawlins, 606 F.3d at 82; see Fed. R. Evid. 901(a) 
advisory committee’s note (1972) (“This requirement of 
showing authenticity or identity [under Rule 901(a)] falls in 
the category of relevancy dependent upon fulfillment of a 
condition of fact and is governed by the procedure set forth in 
Rule 104(b).”). 
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104(b).  We have determined that to meet the Rule 104(b) 
standard of sufficiency, the proponent of the evidence must 
show that “the jury could reasonably find th[ose] facts . . . by 
a preponderance of the evidence.”  United States v. Bergrin, 
682 F.3d 261, 278 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting Huddleston v. 
United States, 485 U.S. 681, 690 (1998)) (alterations in 
original); see also United States v. Khorozian, 333 F.3d 498, 
506 (3d Cir. 2003) (“Authentication does not conclusively 
establish the genuineness of an item; it is a foundation that a 
jury may reject.”). 
 Here, the relevance of the Facebook records hinges on 
the fact of authorship.  To authenticate the messages, the 
Government was therefore required to introduce enough 
evidence such that the jury could reasonably find, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, that Browne and the victims 
authored the Facebook messages at issue.  The records 
custodian here, however, attested only that the 
communications took place as alleged between the named 
Facebook accounts.  Thus, accepting the Government’s 
contention that it fulfilled its authentication obligation simply 
by submitting such an attestation would amount to holding 
that social media evidence need not be subjected to a 
“relevance” assessment prior to admission.  Our sister 
Circuits have rejected this proposition in both the digital and 
non-digital contexts, as do we.  See United States v. Vayner, 
769 F.3d 125, 132 (2d Cir. 2014) (holding that a social media 
profile page was not properly authenticated where the 
government offered evidence only that the webpage existed 
and not that it belonged to the defendant); United States v. 
Southard, 700 F.2d 1, 23 (1st Cir. 1983) (observing that self-
authentication “does not eliminate the requirement of 
relevancy” and requiring testimony linking the codefendant, 
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who had a common name, to the driver’s license and work 
permit issued under that name). 
 The Government’s theory of self-authentication also 
fails for a second reason: it is predicated on a 
misunderstanding of the business records exception itself.  
Rule 803(6) is designed to capture records that are likely 
accurate and reliable in content, as demonstrated by the 
trustworthiness of the underlying sources of information and 
the process by which and purposes for which that information 
is recorded.7  See E. C. Ernst, Inc. v. Koppers Co., 626 F.2d 
324, 330–31 (3d Cir. 1980) (holding that pricing sheets 
satisfied Rule 803(6) because, among other things, “the sheets 
were checked for accuracy”); see also United States v. Gurr, 
471 F.3d 144, 152 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (“Because the regularity 
of making the record is evidence of its accuracy, statements 
by ‘outsiders’ are not admissible for their truth under Fed. R. 
Evid. 803(6).”); Fed. R. Evid. 803 advisory committee’s note 
(1972) (“The element of unusual reliability of business 
records is said variously to be supplied by systematic 
checking, by regularity and continuity which produce habits 
                                                 
 7 When we stated in United States v. Console that 
“Rule 803(6) does not require that the person transmitting the 
recorded information be under a business duty to provide 
accurate information,” 13 F.3d 641, 657 (3d Cir. 1993), we 
were observing that accuracy need not be guaranteed, but in 
no way suggested that accuracy is irrelevant.  On the 
contrary, we went on to state: “[I]t is sufficient if it is shown 
that . . . [the] standard practice was to verify the information 
provided, or that the information transmitted met the 
requirements of another hearsay exception.”  Id. at 657–58 
(citations omitted) (alterations in original) (emphasis added). 
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of precision, by actual experience of business in relying upon 
them, or by a duty to make an accurate record as part of a 
continuing job or occupation.”). 
 Here, Facebook does not purport to verify or rely on 
the substantive contents of the communications in the course 
of its business.  At most, the records custodian employed by 
the social media platform can attest to the accuracy of only 
certain aspects of the communications exchanged over that 
platform, that is, confirmation that the depicted 
communications took place between certain Facebook 
accounts, on particular dates, or at particular times.  This is no 
more sufficient to confirm the accuracy or reliability of the 
contents of the Facebook chats than a postal receipt would be 
to attest to the accuracy or reliability of the contents of the 
enclosed mailed letter.  See United States v. Jackson, 208 
F.3d 633, 637–38 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that Internet 
Service Providers’ ability to retrieve information that their 
customers posted online did not turn the posts that appeared 
on the website of a white supremacist group into the ISP’s 
business records under Rule 803(6)); cf. In re U.S. for 
Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600, 611 (5th Cir. 2013) 
(for Fourth Amendment purposes, defining business records 
as “records of transactions to which the record-keeper is a 
party,” in contradistinction to “[c]ommunications content, 
such as the contents of letters, phone calls, and emails, which 
are not directed to a business, but simply sent via that 
business”). 
 We have made a similar determination in the banking 
context.  In United States v. Furst, 886 F.2d 558 (3d Cir. 
1989), we held that the district court erred in admitting bank 
records as business records under Rule 803(6), even though 
the records verified the dates and amounts of certain deposits 
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and receipts, because “significant” other portions of these 
documents had not been independently verified, and the 
records custodians lacked “knowledge as to the accuracy of 
the information on which the [bank] documents was based or 
as to the knowledge of the persons who prepared the records.”  
Id. at 572. 
 If the Government here had sought to authenticate only 
the timestamps on the Facebook chats, the fact that the chats 
took place between particular Facebook accounts, and 
similarly technical information verified by Facebook “in the 
course of a regularly conducted activity,” the records might 
be more readily analogized to bank records or phone records 
conventionally authenticated and admitted under Rules 
902(11) and 803(6).  See id. at 573 (concluding that the 
district court erred in admitting bank statements in the bank’s 
possession under Rule 803(6) “to the extent the statements 
contained any data other than confirmations of transactions” 
with the bank).  We need not address the tenability of this 
narrow proposition here, however, as the Government’s 
interest lies in establishing the admissibility of the chat logs 
in full.  It suffices for us to conclude that, considered in their 
entirety, the Facebook records are not business records under 
Rule 803(6) and thus cannot be authenticated by way of Rule 
902(11).  In fact, the Government’s position would mean that 
all electronic information whose storage or transmission 
could be verified by a third-party service provider would be 
exempt from the hearsay rules—a novel proposition indeed, 
and one we are unwilling to espouse. 
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B.  Authentication by way of extrinsic evidence 
 Our conclusion that the Facebook chat logs were not 
properly authenticated under Rule 902(11) does not end our 
inquiry, for we may consider whether the Government has 
presented sufficient extrinsic evidence to authenticate the chat 
logs under Rule 901(a).  See Vatyan v. Mukasey, 508 F.3d 
1179, 1184 (9th Cir. 2007); United States v. Dockins, 986 
F.2d 888, 895 (5th Cir. 1993).  To answer this question, we 
look to what the rule means in the social media context and 
how it applies to the facts here. 
Conventionally, authorship may be established for 
authentication purposes by way of a wide range of extrinsic 
evidence.  See Fed. R. Evid. 901(b).  In United States v. 
McGlory, 968 F.2d 309 (3d Cir. 1992), for example, we 
rejected a defendant’s challenge to the authentication of notes 
that he had allegedly handwritten because, despite being 
unable to fully establish authorship through a handwriting 
expert, the prosecution had provided “sufficient evidence 
from which the jury could find that [the defendant] authored 
the notes.”  Id. at 329.  The notes had been seized from the 
trash outside the defendant’s known residences; some of the 
notes were torn from a notebook found inside his residences; 
some notes were found in the same garbage bag as other 
identifying information; and certain notes were written on 
note paper from hotels where the defendant stayed during the 
alleged conspiracy.  Id. at 328–29.  
 Similarly, in United States v. Reilly, 33 F.3d 1396 (3d 
Cir. 1994), when considering whether the government’s 
evidence “support[ed] the conclusion that the radiotelegrams 
are what the government claims they are, namely 
radiotelegrams to and from the Khian Sea, many of which 
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were sent or received by [the defendant],” we determined that 
the government had met its authentication burden by way of 
not only direct testimony from individuals who identified the 
radiotelegrams but also “multiple pieces of circumstantial 
evidence.”  Id. at 1405–06.  This included testimony 
explaining how the witness who produced the radiotelegrams 
had come to possess them, the physical appearance of the 
radiotelegrams, and evidence that the radiotelegrams were 
sent to the defendant’s office or telex number.  Id. at 1406. 
We hold today that it is no less proper to consider a 
wide range of evidence for the authentication of social media 
records than it is for more traditional documentary evidence.  
The authentication of electronically stored information in 
general requires consideration of the ways in which such data 
can be manipulated or corrupted, see generally Lorraine v. 
Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534 (D. Md. 2007), and the 
authentication of social media evidence in particular presents 
some special challenges because of the great ease with which 
a social media account may be falsified or a legitimate 
account may be accessed by an imposter, cf. Griffin v. State, 
19 A.3d 415, 424 (Md. 2011) (analyzing state analogue to 
Rule 901).  But the authentication rules do not lose their 
logical and legal force as a result.  See Tienda v. State, 358 
S.W.3d 633, 638–39 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (describing the 
legal consensus as to the applicability of traditional 
evidentiary rules to electronic communications and 
identifying the many forms of circumstantial evidence that 
have been used to authenticate email printouts, internet chat 
room conversations, and cellular text messages); see also 
Parker v. State, 85 A.3d 682, 687 (Del. 2014) (analyzing state 
evidentiary rules and concluding that “[a]lthough we are 
mindful of the concern that social media evidence could be 
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falsified, the existing [rules] provide an appropriate 
framework for determining admissibility.”); Burgess v. State, 
742 S.E.2d 464, 467 (Ga. 2013) (“Documents from electronic 
sources such as the printouts from a website like MySpace are 
subject to the same [state] rules of authentication as other 
more traditional documentary evidence and may be 
authenticated through circumstantial evidence.”).  Depending 
on the circumstances of the case, a variety of factors could 
help support or diminish the proponent’s claims as to the 
authenticity of a document allegedly derived from a social 
media website, and the Rules of Evidence provide the courts 
with the appropriate framework within which to conduct that 
analysis. 
Those Courts of Appeals that have considered the 
issue have reached the same conclusion.  In United States v. 
Barnes, 803 F.3d 209 (5th Cir. 2015), the Fifth Circuit held 
that the government laid a sufficient foundation to support the 
admission of the defendant’s Facebook messages under Rule 
901 where a witness testified that she had seen the defendant 
using Facebook and that she recognized his Facebook account 
as well as his style of communicating as reflected in the 
disputed messages.  Id. at 217.  In United States v. Hassan, 
742 F.3d 104 (4th Cir. 2014), the Fourth Circuit held that the 
government properly linked the Facebook pages at issue to 
the defendants by using internet protocol addresses to trace 
the Facebook pages and accounts to the defendants’ mailing 
and email addresses.8  Id. at 133.  And in Vayner, the Second 
                                                 
 8 The Fourth Circuit also ruled that those Facebook 
pages were properly authenticated under Rule 902(11).  
Hassan, 742 F.3d at 133–34.  For the reasons already stated 
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Circuit held that the government failed to adequately 
authenticate what it alleged was a printout of the defendant’s 
profile page from a Russian social networking site where it 
offered no evidence to show that the defendant had created 
the page.  769 F.3d at 131.  In all of these cases, the courts 
considered a variety of extrinsic evidence to determine 
whether the government had met its authentication burden 
under Rule 901—each reiterating, in the course of that 
analysis, that conclusive proof of authenticity is not required 
and that the jury, not the court, is the ultimate arbiter of 
whether an item of evidence is what its proponent claims it to 
be.  Barnes, 803 F.3d at 217; Vayner, 769 F.3d at 131; 
Hassan, 742 F.3d at 133. 
Applying the same approach here, we conclude the 
Government provided more than adequate extrinsic evidence 
to support that the disputed Facebook records reflected online 
conversations that took place between Browne, Dalmida, and 
three of the four minors, such that “the jury could reasonably 
find” the authenticity of the records “by a preponderance of 
the evidence.”  Bergrin, 682 F.3d at 278. 
First, although the four witnesses who participated in 
the Facebook chats at issue—Dalmida and three of the 
minors—did not directly identify the records at trial, each 
offered detailed testimony about the exchanges that she had 
over Facebook.  This testimony was consistent with the 
content of the four chat logs that the Government introduced 
into evidence.  Dalmida and two of the minors whose chat 
logs are at issue further testified that after conversing with the 
                                                                                                             
above, we do not agree with this portion of the court’s 
authentication holding. 
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Button Facebook account or the 998 number that they 
received through communications with Button, they met in 
person with Button—whom they were able to identify in open 
court as Browne.  This constitutes powerful evidence not only 
establishing the accuracy of the chat logs but also linking 
them to Browne.  See United States v. Tank, 200 F.3d 627, 
630–31 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding government made a prima 
face showing of authenticity under Rule 901(a) in part 
because several co-conspirators testified that the defendant 
was the person who showed up to a meeting that they had 
arranged with the person who used that screen name). 
 Second, as reflected in the trial testimony of both 
Browne and Special Agent Blyden, Browne made significant 
concessions that served to link him to the Facebook 
conversations.  Most notably, Browne testified that he owned 
the “Billy Button” Facebook account on which the search 
warrant had been executed and that he knew and had 
conversed on Facebook with Dalmida and two of the minors.  
See, e g., Tank, 200 F.3d at 630–31 (holding government met 
authentication burden where, among other things, defendant 
admitted that screenname used in disputed text messages 
belonged to him).  Browne also testified that he owned the 
phone that was seized from his residence—the same phone 
from which DHS recovered certain images that the victims 
identified on the stand as those they sent in response to 
commands from either the Button or Dalmida Facebook 
account or the 998 number.  Cf. United States v. Simpson, 152 
F.3d 1241, 1249–50 (10th Cir. 1998) (rejecting the 
defendant’s claim that the trial court erred in admitting a 
printout of an alleged chat room discussion between the 
defendant and an undercover officer where, among other 
things, the pages seized from the defendant’s home contained 
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identifying information that the undercover officer had given 
the individual in the chat room).  And Browne admitted that 
he owned a second phone with the 344 number, which is 
significant because, although Browne attempted to distance 
himself from the incriminating phone with the 998 number 
with the unsupported contention that he loaned it to other 
individuals at various points in the relevant time period, one 
of the challenged Facebook conversations shows that 
“Button” also provided the 344 number to minor J.S. on two 
occasions while trying to elicit sexual acts and photos.  In 
addition, in Browne’s post-arrest statements, which were 
introduced at trial, he provided the passwords to the Button 
Facebook account and to the phone with the 998 number and 
admitted to exchanging nude photos with Dalmida, paying 
J.S. for nude photos, going to J.B.’s home, and knowing a 
third minor, T.P., whom he referenced by Facebook account 
name. 
 Third, contrary to Browne’s contention that “there is 
no biographical information in the [Facebook] records that 
links [him] to the documents,” Appellant’s Br. at 17, the 
personal information that Browne confirmed on the stand was 
consistent with the personal details that “Button” interspersed 
throughout his Facebook conversations with Dalmida and 
three of the minors.  For example, Browne testified that his 
address was 2031 Estate Lovenlund, that he was a plumber, 
and that he had a fiancée.  The Facebook messages sent by 
“Button” are, in turn, replete with references to the fact that 
the sender was located or resided at Lovenlund.  “Button” 
also stated to one minor, “I’m a plumber.”  App. 503.  The 
chats reflect that somewhere on his Facebook profile, Button 
represented himself as being engaged.  And in one of the 
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disputed Facebook chats, Button informed a minor that his 
name was “Tony . . . Browne.”9  App. 519. 
 Lastly, the Government not only provided ample 
evidence linking Browne to the Button Facebook account but 
also supported the accuracy of the chat logs by obtaining 
them directly from Facebook and introducing a certificate 
attesting to their maintenance by the company’s automated 
systems.  To the extent that certified records straight from the 
third-party service provider are less likely to be subject to 
manipulation or inadvertent distortion than, for instance, 
printouts of website screenshots, the method by which the 
Government procured the records in this case constitutes yet 
more circumstantial evidence that the records are what the 
Government claims.  
                                                 
 9 Browne argues that none of these biographical details 
constituted “information that only [he] could be expected to 
know,” Appellant’s Br. at 19, but we need not determine that, 
by itself, the information could suffice to authenticate the chat 
logs to conclude that they have some authentication value 
when considered in combination with all of the other 
available evidence.  See Simpson, 152 F.3d at 1244 (computer 
printout of alleged chat room discussions properly 
authenticated not only by physical evidence recovered from 
defendant’s home but also in light of the fact that the 
individual participating in the chat gave the undercover 
officer the defendant’s first initial and last name and street 
address); Bloom v. Com., 554 S.E.2d 84, 86–87 (Va. 2001) 
(defendant was sufficiently identified as individual who made 
statements over instant message where detailed biographical 
information provided online matched that of the defendant).   
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In short, this is not a case where the records proponent 
has put forth tenuous evidence attributing to an individual 
social media or online activity that very well could have been 
conducted or fabricated by a third party.  See, e.g., Vayner, 
769 F.3d at 131; see also Smith v. State, 136 So.3d 424, 433 
(Miss. 2014) (holding that name and photo on Facebook 
printout were not sufficient to link communication to alleged 
author); Griffin, 19 A.3d at 423 (holding that the trial court 
abused its discretion in admitting MySpace website evidence 
because the state both failed to explain how it had obtained 
the challenged records and failed to adequately link the 
records to the defendant’s girlfriend).  Far from it.  This 
record reflects abundant evidence linking Browne and the 
testifying victims to the chats conducted through the Button 
Facebook account and reflected in the logs procured from 
Facebook.  The Facebook records were thus duly 
authenticated.   
Browne makes much of the fact that the Government 
failed to ask the testifying witnesses point-blank to identify 
the disputed Facebook chats.  As we explained, however, in 
McQueeney v. Wilmington Trust Co., 779 F.2d 916 (3d Cir. 
1985), where we reversed the district court’s determination 
that certain records could not be admitted into evidence 
unless they were introduced by a testifying witness, 
circumstantial evidence can suffice to authenticate a 
document.  Id. at 928; see also Fed. R. Evid. 903 (“A 
subscribing witness’s testimony is necessary to authenticate a 
writing only if required by the law of the jurisdiction that 
governs its validity.”).  Although a witness with personal 
knowledge may authenticate a document by testifying that the 
document is what the evidence proponent claims it to be, this 
is merely one possible means of authentication and not, as 
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Browne would have it, an exclusive requirement.  See Fed. R. 
Evid. 901(b)(1); Simpson, 152 F.3d at 1249–50 (rejecting the 
defendant’s contention that statements from a chat room 
discussion could not be attributed to him where the 
government could not identify that they “were in his 
handwriting, his writing style, or his voice,” as “[t]he specific 
examples of authentication referred to by [the defendant] . . . 
are not intended as an exclusive enumeration of allowable 
methods of authentication”). 
In sum, Browne’s authentication challenge collapses 
under the veritable mountain of evidence linking Browne to 
Billy Button and the incriminating chats.  
C.  Admissibility 
Having concluded that the Facebook records were 
properly authenticated by way of extrinsic evidence, we turn 
to Browne’s more general argument that the records were 
inadmissible.  Evidence that is properly authenticated may 
nonetheless be inadmissible hearsay if it contains out-of-court 
statements, written or oral, that are offered for the truth of the 
matter asserted and do not fall under any exception 
enumerated under Federal Rule of Evidence 802.  McGlory, 
968 F.2d at 331. 
Here, the Government offered more than sufficient 
evidence to authenticate four of the five Facebook records as 
chats that Browne himself participated in by way of the 
Button account, and these four records were properly 
admitted as admissions by a party opponent under Rule 
801(d)(2)(A).  See id. at 334 & n.17 (observing that 
handwritten notes were admissible as admissions by a party 
opponent if the prosecution established defendant’s 
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authorship by a preponderance of the evidence); see also 
United States v. Brinson, 772 F.3d 1314, 1320 (10th Cir. 
2014) (same conclusion regarding Facebook messages); 
United States v. Siddiqui, 235 F.3d 1318, 1323 (11th Cir. 
2000) (same conclusion regarding authenticated email).10  
Not so for the fifth. 
We agree with Browne that the single chat in which 
Browne did not participate and which took place between 
Dalmida and J.B. regarding Button’s “almost rape[]” of J.B. 
was inadmissible hearsay.  App. 483.  Notwithstanding the 
other reasons the Government may have sought to admit it, 
the record functioned at least in part to prove the truth of the 
matter asserted, that is, that Browne sexually assaulted J.B. 
and subsequently threatened her with video evidence of the 
                                                 
 10 As for the statements in the chat logs that the victims 
made to Browne, under our precedent they were not hearsay 
because they were not offered into evidence to prove the truth 
of the matter asserted; rather, they were introduced to put 
Browne’s statements “into perspective and make them 
intelligible to the jury and recognizable as admissions.”  
United States v. Hendricks, 395 F.3d 173, 184 (3d Cir. 2005) 
(quoting United States v. McDowell, 918 F.2d 1004, 1007 (1st 
Cir. 1990)); see also McDowell, 918 F.2d at 1007–08 (“[The 
defendant’s] part of the conversations was plainly not 
hearsay. Nor can a defendant, having made admissions, keep 
from the jury other segments of the discussion reasonably 
required to place those admissions into context . . . . 
Moreover, because [the informant’s] statements were 
introduced only to establish that they were uttered and to give 
context to what [the defendant] was saying, they were not 
hearsay at all.”). 
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assault.  See McGlory, 968 F.2d at 332 (“This Court . . . has 
disfavored the admission of statements which are not 
technically admitted for the truth of the matter asserted, 
whenever the matter asserted, without regard to its truth 
value, implies that the defendant is guilty of the crime 
charged.”).11 
                                                 
 11 As with authentication, we do not foreclose the 
possibility that the chat log might have warranted a different 
hearsay analysis had the Government sought the admission of 
only limited portions of it.  In United States v. Turner, 718 
F.3d 226 (3d Cir. 2013), for example, where we assessed the 
admissibility of certain bank records, we held that the district 
court did not clearly err in applying the residual hearsay 
exception, which permits a district court to admit an out-of-
court statement not covered by Rules 803 or 804 where, 
among other things, “the statement has equivalent 
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness.”  Id. at 233 
(quoting Fed. R. Evid. 807).  But the Government here does 
not contend that this hearsay exception or any others 
enumerated in Rule 803 are applicable to this chat log.  And 
with good reason.  For instance, although the log reflects that 
the chat participants made a number of emotionally charged 
statements, it purports to describe an event that occurred the 
previous day and thus was not admissible under the present 
sense impression or excited utterance exception to the hearsay 
rule.  Fed. R. Evid. 803(1)–(2); see United States v. Green, 
556 F.3d 151, 156 (3d Cir. 2009); United States v. Brown, 
254 F.3d 454, 458 (3d Cir. 2001).  And nothing in the record 
or the Government’s brief suggests the chat log was 
introduced to show Dalmida or J.B.’s “then-existing state of 
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 Although we conclude that the District Court erred in 
admitting this chat log, we do not perceive grounds for 
reversal.  Reversal is not warranted if it is “highly probable 
that the error did not contribute to the judgment.”  United 
States v. Brown, 765 F.3d 278, 295 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting 
United States v. Cunningham, 694 F.3d 372, 391–92 (3d Cir. 
2012)).  This “high probability” standard for non-
constitutional harmless error determinations “requires that the 
court possess a sure conviction that the error did not prejudice 
the defendant.”  United States v. Franz, 772 F.3d 134, 151 
(3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Cunningham, 694 F.3d at 392). 
 We are confident there was no prejudice here.  As 
detailed above, the Government set forth abundant evidence 
that not only served to tie Browne and the victims to the chat 
logs but also supported Browne’s guilt on all of the counts for 
which he was convicted irrespective of those records.  Indeed, 
the two individuals who made the hearsay statements 
reflected in the fifth chat log, Dalmida and J.B., testified at 
length to the very details included in that Facebook chat log.  
Because there was overwhelming, properly admitted evidence 
supporting Browne’s conviction on every count, and the sole 
improperly admitted Facebook record was “at most, 
duplicative of [the witnesses’] admissible testimony,” United 
States v. Kapp, 781 F.2d 1008, 1014 (3d Cir. 1986), the 
erroneous admission was harmless and Browne’s convictions 
must be sustained.  See Barnes, 803 F.3d at 218 (concluding 
that any potential error in admitting disputed Facebook 
messages was harmless, as “the content of the messages was 
                                                                                                             
mind,” Fed. R. Evid. 803(3).  See United States v. Donley, 
878 F.2d 735, 737 (3d Cir. 1989).   
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largely duplicative” of witness testimony and “given the 
overwhelming evidence of [the defendant’s] guilt”). 
* * * 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment 
of the District Court. 
